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Abstract This chapter lays out what we take to be the main types of justice and
ethical challenges concerning those adverse effects of climate change leading to
climate-related Loss and Damage (L&D). We argue that it is essential to clearly
differentiate between the challenges concerning mitigation and adaptation and those
ethical issues exclusively relevant for L&D in order to address the ethical aspects
pertaining to L&D in international climate policy. First, we show that depending
on how mitigation and adaptation are distinguished from L&D, the primary focus
of policy measures and their ethical implications will vary. Second, we distinguish
between a distributive justice framework and a compensatory justice scheme for
delivering L&D measures. Third, in order to understand the differentiated remedial
responsibilities concerning L&D, we categorise the measures and policy approaches
available. Fourth, depending on the kind of L&D and which remedies are possible,
we explain the difference between remedial and outcome responsibilities of different
actors.
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2.1 Introduction
Debate in ethics concerning climate change has mainly investigated questions of
how to deal with mitigation and adaptation. Much of the debate has been on climate
justice asking how to distribute the benefits and burdens of mitigation and adapta-
tion fairly; dealing with the rights of those facing the impacts of climate change; or
discussing the individual moral duty to change lifestyles in order to contribute to cli-
mate protection. An important detail of this debate is that mitigation and adaptation
are often discussed under one and the same heading. Potential differences between
duties related to climate change mitigation and those of adaptation are rarely anal-
ysed. Research dealing with this distinction, however, shows that there are crucial
differences between the ethical challenges of mitigation and those of adaptation
(Jagers and Duus-Otterström 2008; Wallimann-Helmer 2015, 2016). We build on
this distinction to discuss a further distinctive area of climate change research and
policy: the adverse effects of climate change leading to climate related Loss and
Damage (for short: L&D). As we argue and demonstrate throughout, in order to
address the ethical aspects pertaining to L&D in international climate policy it is
essential to clearly differentiate between the challenges concerning mitigation and
adaptation and those ethical issues exclusively relevant for L&D.
This chapter lays out what we take to be the main ethical challenges concerning
climate L&D. Building on this diagnosis, we develop criteria to categorise measures
as being appropriate for dealing with L&D and analyse how the responsibilities com-
ing with these measures must be distributed to be just. First, we show that depending
on how mitigation and adaptation are distinguished from L&D, the primary focus
of policy measures and their ethical implications will vary (2.2). Second, we distin-
guish between a distributive justice framework and a compensatory justice scheme
for delivering L&Dmeasures.We discuss some theoretical advantages of distributive
justice frameworks, but do not decide the issue. One key advantage for a distributive
justice approach is that it covers all L&D rather than only the fraction that is anthro-
pogenically induced (2.3). Third, in order to understand the types of measures that
these justice approaches could apply to, we analyse the appropriateness of different
measures and policy approaches available (2.4). Fourth, depending on the kind of
L&D and which remedies are possible, responsibilities of different actors are found
to vary (2.5). In particular, we discuss the distinction between remedial responsibil-
ity and outcome responsibility. Overall, while our primary aim here is to map out
the most important arguments and principles in climate ethics dealing with L&D,
we also argue that the capacity to most efficiently and effectively contribute to even
out undeserved harm from L&D is crucial. One of our suggestions is that it is the
differentiated capacities of those able to support the ones in need of assistance that
should matter the most when differentiating remedial responsibilities to tackle L&D.
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2.2 Two Approaches to Distinguish Between Adaptation
and L&D
Some argue that the three pillars of climate policy at the UNFCCC level are miti-
gation, adaptation, and L&D (see introduction by Mechler et al. 2018; chapter by
Calliari et al. 2018). While mitigation can be distinguished from adaptation quite
easily (mitigation involves reducing GHG emissions and enhancing sinks and reser-
voirswhereas adaptation involves the processes, practices, and structures tomoderate
potential negative impacts), L&D is more challenging to differentiate from adapta-
tion. Nevertheless, we can adopt a standard definition which helps to separate the
two: in a climate change context, L&D may refer to actions dealing with the resid-
ual, adverse impacts of climate change which remain after mitigation and adaptation
measures have been adopted (Mace and Verheyen 2016). We call this the “beyond
adaptation” approach. This is similar to what the parties to the UNFCCC acknowl-
edge in Decision 2/CP.19 when they state that L&D “involves more than, that which
can be reduced by adaptation” (UNFCCC 2014).
In the literature, an alternative approach to the distinction is that adaptation
involves responses to keep risks within the range of tolerable risk whereas L&D
involves responses to risks that cannot be kept within the range of tolerable risks
and so become intolerable. This means that despite adaptation measures these risks
exceed socially negotiated norms or values defining tolerability (Dow et al. 2013a, b;
Wallimann-Helmer 2015; see chapter by Schinko et al. 2018). We call this the “risk
tolerance” approach. Depending on which of these approaches is chosen, different
kinds of responsibilities and measures will become the primary focus of policy. In
the following, we first show why this is the case and then argue why in setting these
priorities both approaches complement each other.
The question of which responsibilities and measures the “beyond adaptation”
approach encompasses can be elaborated by considering whether the climate-related
impacts cannot be avoided or will not be avoided in the future by mitigation or
adaptation (Mace and Verheyen 2016). In the literature, this same distinction has
also been discussed in terms of unavoidable and unavoided impacts (Roderick and
Verheyen 2008). According to this approach, a key reason why some adaptation
measures that could have been taken will not be taken is that actors may be subject to
socio-economic constraints. Typically, L&D measures are not taken due to a lack of
international financing, implementation restrictions, or political constraints leading
to soft and hard limits (Chambwera and Mohammed 2014). The Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) sees soft limits if adaptation constraints can in
principle be overcome in contrast to hard adaptation limits, where constraints lead
to limits that cannot be overcome (Klein et al. 2014).
To illustrate this, imagine a scenario in which members of the Alliance of Small
Island States (AOSIS), without international financing, may be unable to afford
large-scale beach renourishment needed to guard against the impacts of high sea
level rise. In turn, such adaptation would be taken were there sufficient financial (or
other) resources available. The impacts associated with the inability to conduct such
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large-scale beach renourishment can be considered losses and damages that will not
be avoided. But it does not fall within the category of hard adaptation limits: impacts
that cannot be avoided. Impacts that cannot be avoided are losses and damages that
will materialize whatever measures are taken to adapt. For instance, AOSIS groups
relocating due to sea-level rise that leads to loss of their homelands and damages to
many of their valued assets (see chapters by Handmer and Nalau 2018; Heslin 2018).
These losses and damages, which comprise market and non-market values, cannot
be avoided by adapting to the new conditions regardless of the level of financial and
other assistance.
This first “beyond adaptation” approach distinguishes L&D from adaptation
by focusing on whether the different impacts can be avoided or will be avoided
by appropriate measures without any assessment by those facing potential L&D.
This is different from the “risk tolerance” approach. This second approach to
distinguishing between adaptation and L&D focuses on how those facing the
risks of L&D evaluate these risks. Risks of climate impacts that are judged to be
intolerable are considered L&D and are contrasted with tolerable risks that are
understood to be avoidable through adaptation (Dow et al. 2013a, b; Mechler and
Schinko 2016; Wallimann-Helmer 2015). Such an evaluation of risks as intolerable,
and thus relevant for L&D, presupposes value judgments that can only be taken
by those facing those risks. Thus, according to the “risk tolerance” approach, it is
crucial that those potentially facing climate impacts can assess the risks they are
facing. Since different communities might assess similar risks differently, they will
demand different measures that might fall within either the category of adaptation
or L&D (see chapter by Schinko et al. 2018).
The “risk tolerance” approach primarily relies on the value judgments of those
facingpotential climate impacts. This not only showswhy, according to this approach,
the distinction between adaptation andL&Dtends to be blurred. It also showswhy it is
most probably associated with a primary concern to foster appropriate structures and
institutions for collective decision-making and capacity building within and among
potentially impacted communities. The decisions regarding what measures should
be taken, by whom and how they should be implemented are relegated to secondary
importance. Thus, priorities regarding climate L&D tend to differ depending on
the way of distinguishing adaptation from L&D (see Table 2.1). For the “beyond
adaptation” approach, priority lies with fostering implementation of efficient and
effective L&D measures, i.e. measures not being prone to soft and hard adaptation
limits. For the “risk tolerance” approach, in contrast, priority lies with supporting
capacity building in order for communities facing climate impacts to be better able
to collectively assess the risks they face.
Thus, while the first approach to distinguishing adaptation and L&D mainly
focuses on the impacts and the measures they demand to differentiate responsibili-
ties, the second approach primarily derives the responsibilities to be differentiated
from whether and to what extent capacity building is necessary. On the “risk toler-
ance” approach, although support for implementing L&D measures is of secondary
concern, it may in fact be more effective for support to be provided if needed. As
suggested by adaptation research, implementation of L&D measures is likely to be
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Table 2.1 Difference in policy priority depending on how adaptation and L&D are distinguished
Beyond adaptation Risk tolerance
1st policy
priority
Implementing the most efficient and
effective measures to deal with
unavoided and unavoidable L&D
Fostering collective decision-making
and capacity building to assess
climate risks as acceptable, tolerable
or intolerable
2nd policy
priority
Involving local communities to secure
efficient and effective implementation
of measures to be taken
Implementing those measures
understood to be most efficient and
effective to deal with the threats as
evaluated
more effective and efficient if accompanied by capacity building and involvement of
local communities in decisions andmanagement (cf. Kaswan 2016). Responsibilities
for capacity building and fostering involvement thus also follow as important con-
cerns when distributing responsibilities from the “beyond adaptation” perspective
to distinguish adaptation and L&D. Even though the two approaches to distinguish
adaptation and L&D tend to set different priorities, the foci they suggest regarding
the measures to be taken complement each other.
This is so, because, regardless of the approach used to distinguish L&D from
adaptation, in the end L&D concerns impacts that are in fact expected to materialise.
Thus, L&D measures are expected to respond to or minimise the socio-economic or
human effects of these impacts, but these measures are not expected to prevent these
impacts altogether. In practical terms, they are expected to e.g. enhance transforma-
tive capacities to comprehensively deal with climate-related risks beyond traditional
adaptation or to enhance trust and respect between countries facing L&D and those
contributing to it.1 Consequently, preventing climate impacts from materialising is
a goal only to be ascribed to mitigation and adaptation—but not to L&D measures.
There are a variety of measures which can be used to address L&D demanding dif-
ferent kinds of responsibilities, which we classify below (Sects. 2.3 and 2.4). Before
it is possible to come to this classification, however, wemust first be clearer about the
nature of measures that can fall within the category of L&D. In this regard and as dis-
cussed below, paragraph 52 of decision 1/CP.21 accompanying the Paris agreement
becomes highly relevant.
2.3 Neither Compensation Nor Liability Under
the UNFCCC
When a damage or a loss occurs, it seems natural to ask who is liable for that
harm and to demand repair or compensation of the damage or loss (Shue 1999,
2017). This is why the most natural way to investigate the ethical implications of
1For discussion of this latter point see Cohen (2016), O’Neill (2017), Thompson and Otto (2015).
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L&D would be by considering compensatory or rectificatory justice. These kinds
of justice considerations define the appropriate remedy for a damage or a loss. A
classical compensatory principle, for example, demands that the victim is made
whole again. The victims should find themselves in the same condition as they had
been before infliction; to wit, as they would have been had the harm never occurred
(Wallimann-Helmer 2015; Page and Heyward 2016). According to considerations of
compensatory justice it is key to identify the inflictors contributing to the occurrence
of harm, because, according to the most common understanding of compensation,
those causing harm are seen as liable to make those they inflicted whole again.
In terms of climate L&D, such a principle requires that those facing L&D should
be made whole again by those liable for these harms. This is first and foremost the
major greenhouse gas emitters who contribute or have contributed themost to climate
change and in so doing to climate-related L&D.
Although such considerations of compensatory justice are plausible and impor-
tant, in the following we argue that a different justice framing of how to consider
the ethical implications of climate L&D must be considered alternatively or in con-
junction with the intuitive compensatory view. This alternative framing is based on
considerations of distributive justice. There are at least two reasons for considering
this alternative framework. First, on pragmatic grounds in light of paragraph 52 of
decision 1/CP.21 such an alternative framing may make acceptance of L&D mea-
sures among potential donor countries more feasible, at least under current political
conditions. This is so, because decision 1/CP.21 makes explicit that “Article 8 of the
[Paris] Agreement does not involve or provide a basis for any liability or compensa-
tion” (UNFCCC 2015).2 Second, this alternative framing allows to fully capture the
exigence of those actually facing L&D since it allows not only assignment of reme-
dial responsibilities for anthropogenic climate L&D as is the case with compensatory
claims but also responsibilities for L&D caused by natural climate variability (reme-
dial responsibilities are discussed at greater length in 2.5). Compensatory justice is
only owed for anthropogenic L&D because, conceptually speaking, those inflicting
harm on others are only under a duty to compensate for the harms they cause while
natural climate variation is not addressed. For the remainder of this section we elab-
orate on the differences between compensatory and distributive justice framings (see
Table 2.2).
Compensatory Justice
To better understand the differences in framing ethical implications of L&D in terms
of distributive justice, it is helpful to clarify some issues in analysing these impli-
cations from the perspective of compensatory justice. We can distinguish several
prominent and intuitively plausible principles to justify duties of compensation (cf.
Gardiner et al. 2010). As already mentioned, in the case of L&D the most plausi-
ble responsibility bearer for compensatory duties is the emitter. The corresponding
principle of justice is usually called the Polluter Pays Principle (PPP). A second
prominent principle of justice to warrant compensatory duties identifies the benefi-
2For other readings on the legal perspective see for example Lees (2016), Mayer (2017) and the
chapter by Simlinger and Mayer (2018).
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Table 2.2 Overview of differences between analysing L&D within a framing of compensatory
justice and distributive justice
Compensatory justice Distributive justice
Scope Differentiating responsibilities
in light of compensatory reasons
and liability
L&D understood as undeserved
harm demanding redistribution
to even out this unfairness
Redistribution based on Wrongful emitting Undeserved harms
Temporal context Backward-looking Forward-looking
Implementation horizon Long-term, once attribution
challenges can be tackled
Short- to medium-term, while
attribution challenges still exist
and are a main barrier
ciary of emissions as responsible for providing compensation. This is the Beneficiary
Pays Principle (BPP). In the literature, both principlesmost often identify individuals
as responsibility bearers. But they can also refer to corporations or countries. This is
why sometimes a third principle in some sense combining the first two is invoked.
The Community Pays Principle (CoPP) ascribes the responsibility for compensation
to the polluting and benefitting community. All three principles assign liability for
compensation either to the polluters (PPP), the beneficiaries (BPP) or communities
(CoPP).3 They hold that by emitting, these differing agents acquire responsibility
to make whole again those harmed by the consequences of their emissions. Thus,
decision 1/CP.21 seems to suggest, these agents become liable to compensate for the
L&D they are contributing to causing.
It is important to note that on ethical grounds compensatory duties for climate
L&D are more difficult to justify than it at first appears. There are at least three basic
problems for justifying compensation for L&D (Meyer andRoser 2010;Meyer 2013;
Kolstad et al. 2015): a. Potential duty bearers might not have wrongfully emitted by
exceeding their fair shares of emissions and thus have not acquired any legitimate
compensatory duties; b. Potential duty bearers might have been (blamelessly) igno-
rant about the harmfulness of their emissions and can therefore not be said to be
(fully) responsible to compensate; and c. Potential recipients might be said not to
be wrongfully harmed since they are only wrongfully harmed if they are worse off
due to (wrongful) emissions than they would otherwise be or if they fall below a
specified threshold of harm due to (wrongful) emissions (or both).4
3Although we discuss these three principles as principles identifying the bearers of compensatory
duties, these principles, and especially the beneficiary pays principle have also be shown to be
important in identifying the bearers of duties of distributive justice (see Meyer and Sanklecha
2017).
4By such a threshold of harm, we mean that there is some sufficient (not necessarily minimal)
level of well-being and any individual who falls below that is thereby harmed, regardless of the
counterfactual arrangements (cf. Meyer 2003). In other words, individuals could be harmed by
being below the threshold even if they had never had their interests thwarted by any other particular
individual.
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The challenges associated with identifying the legitimate agents to pay compen-
sation and the legitimate claimants of compensation narrow down the number of
potential recipients of compensatory payments. This number decreases even more
when considering the conceptual challenge that strictly speaking compensation can
only be demanded for anthropogenically induced L&D but not for natural climate
variability (Huggel et al. 2016; Wallimann-Helmer 2015). Natural disasters without
any human cause are tragic and individuals being threatened need to be assisted.How-
ever, this requirement of assistance can only be justified on humanitarian grounds and
for reasons of distributive justice. They cannot be addressed by appeal to compen-
satory justice. This is why, in practice, compensatory claims for some specific (risk
of) L&D demand the detection of anthropogenic cascades demonstrating why this
L&D can be attributed to anthropogenic climate change (Huggel et al. 2013). Hence,
the worry for the advocate of compensatory justice is that some victims of climate
L&D might not be harmed in a normatively relevant sense, whereby considerations
of compensation become unsuitable. Elaborating on these difficulties by considering
individuals as duty bearers and claimants, it becomes possible that many emitters
and legitimate claimants are not identified either as duty bearers or victims. Emitters
only emitting within the limits of their fair shares cannot be identified as liable for
compensation. Similarly, those individuals not wrongfully harmed, are not entitled
to any compensatory payments. These reasons can be taken to be decisive against
addressing L&D in terms of compensatory justice. However, considering the CoPP
both these challenges must be qualified.
According to the assessments of the IPCC and the agreements under theUNFCCC
countries, to wit communities, can definitively be identified as wrongful emitters not
being legitimately excused by ignorance (Meyer and Sanklecha 2017). At least some
agents of industrialised country parties (its citizens, companies or the countries as a
whole) definitively exceed their fair shares of emissions (Shue 2017). Furthermore,
with the publication of the first IPCC report it becomes difficult to argue for excusable
ignorance from 1990 onwards. This suggests ways of how some of the challenges
above can be met. However, even though industrialised countries and at least some
of their companies can potentially be identified as duty bearers, the CoPP still only
succeeds in justifying some compensation for L&D. As shown above, it can only
justify them for some L&D from climate change but not for all since it only warrants
payments for anthropogenic climate L&Dbut not for L&D caused by natural climate
variability. To be clear, this is not necessarily a bad thing. Many developing countries
facing climate L&D would already be much helped if they received some in contrast
to no assistance. In addition, a compensatory approach can be said to be simple
and more strongly in line with international law whereas distributive approaches
are relatively untested in international fora. For instance, considering environmental
issues in terms of reparations for injury has been dominant in legal history (the
influential Trail Smelter case is based on “no harm” considerations, see Simlinger
and Mayer 2018 for complexities in applying international environmental law to this
issue).
Despite these pragmatic advantages, however, from an ethical point of view it
seems highly problematic to only support those facing L&D in coping with part
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of the harm they face. This is so for three reasons. First, the fact that the main
L&D occurs in regions which historically have contributed far less to anthropogenic
climate change seems to unfairly burden those least responsible for these adverse
effects. Second, those regions and countries most burdened with L&D are often
(economically) less well equipped to manage climate impacts once they materialise.
Third and most importantly, since many adverse effects of climate change are not
immediate but linked to slow onset events, it seems appropriate to say that in many
regions of the world we find a situation of more or less acute emergency due to
climate change already.5 In our view, it seems clear that in a case of emergency,
someone is under duty to assist irrespective of whether that agent has caused the
threat (“remedial responsibility”). Such assistance usually is due up to the point
where those under threat are safe again. Thus, it seems inappropriate to only help
countries in need of assistance with L&D up to the point it can be attributed to
anthropogenic climate change and then leave them on their own. That would be
like helping someone drowning to as far to the shore as one has thrown him in, but
then swim away. Rescuing someone drowning means to try one’s best to bring him
safely to the shore irrespective of how much one contributed to the threat. Because
of this, we believe that even in cases in which no one can be ascribed compensatory
responsibility, all of those afflicted by climate L&D are entitled to assistance if they
do not have the capacity to make themselves whole again. This especially applies to
those who, due to climate L&D, fall below a specified threshold of harm.
Distributive Justice
Especially to meet this last challenge, we suggest to also considering an alternative
framingof the ethical implications ofL&D, namely the framingof distributive justice.
According to this alternative framing, rather than regarding L&D as reasons for
compensation only, L&D also provides reasons for redistribution due to undeserved
harms. That is, wrongful emitting would be relinquished as a relevant criterion to
identify the duty bearers for payments in case of L&D. Instead, the focus would be
on the wrongfulness of harms as defined from the perspective of distributive justice.
In other words, the alternative framing to be considered demands redistribution in
case of unfair disadvantage but not compensation due to wrongful emitting.
One way to distinguish between redistribution and compensation starts with the
premise that there is some baseline distribution of goods or bads that is just. This
baseline distribution is on the one hand determined by certain criteria or principles
of justice (such as the priority view, the strict egalitarian view or any other) and on
the other hand by legitimate changes to the distribution (as determined by criteria
or principles of justice) which someone experiences as a result of her own respon-
sible (and non-wrongful) choices. Deviations from this baseline then call for two
different kinds of reactions. In case the reaction the deviation calls for is based on
the wrongfulness of what occurred, we are operating in the realm of compensatory
justice. In case the reaction the deviation calls for is based on the idea of evening out
undeserved benefits or harms (which are due to bad luck, for example, or harmful
5Notably we here understand climate change to encompass both anthropogenic climate change and
natural climate variability.
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but non-wrongful actions), we are operating in the realm of distributive justice since
these undeserved benefits or harms demand redistribution (Meyer 2004; Meyer and
Roser 2010). On the distributional justice approach in the case of L&D, the situation
of communities, who just happen to have “bad luck” to be living in regions more
heavily exposed to climate change, calls for an evening out of these undeserved
harms.
Hence, if necessary to avoid political deadlock in light of decision 1/CP.21 and
to secure assistance not only for the part of L&D that is anthropogenic, but for all
L&D threatening countries and communities, one may speak in terms of undeserved
harms rather than focusing on impacts brought about by wrongful emitters demand-
ing compensation from those liable.Any responsibilities concerningL&Dwould then
be understood as responsibilities that fall into the category of redistribution. In this
manner, L&D-related responsibilities would be regarded as grounded in the objective
of levelling undeserved harms. So, on the one hand, what could be looked for are
ways of differentiating responsibilities without relying on the wrongfulness of emis-
sions, liability and compensation. However, on the other hand, as attribution research
matures and international climate policy develops, it may become more feasible to
rely on causal explanations to help determine the differentiation of responsibilities
in line with a compensatory approach (Boran and Heath 2016; Thompson and Otto
2015; see chapter by James et al. 2018), although doing so may be ambitious at this
point (Huggel et al. 2013; James et al. 2014; Huggel et al. 2016).6
2.4 Categorising L&D Measures to Differentiate
Responsibilities
The previous section leads to an important ethical consideration. Irrespective of the
justice framework applied, the fact that developing countries carry such a large share
of L&D cries out for some kind of response. Such a response makes it necessary
to clarify two issues. On the one hand, it is necessary to be clear about what kinds
of L&D can become relevant since these determine what approaches and policy
measures are most appropriate for either compensation or redistribution. On the
other hand, it is necessary to discuss how responsibilities to provide assistance should
be differentiated. Before analysing the differentiation of responsibilities in the next
section, here we discuss the first of these two issues. We argue that it makes a
significant difference which kinds of climate L&D are at stake since different kinds
of L&D demand different measures requiring varying forms of competence and
6To be sure, one implication of the distributive justice framing is that it brings legitimate claims
for assistance in case of climate L&D on a par with any other claims for assistance in case of
undeserved harm or even more generally any undeserved socio-economic disadvantage. This can
be considered a strength of this alternative framing, because it shows that climate L&D cannot
be appropriately dealt with in isolation (Caney 2012; Wallimann-Helmer 2015). However, it also
points to the weakness of this framing, namely that it expands concerns about L&D beyond what
is currently dealt with under the umbrella of the UNFCCC.
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Table 2.3 Indicative list of measures for different categories of losses and damages. Note that
listed measures are not exhaustive and that these measures could apply under both compensatory
or distributive justice framings
Replaceable L&D (economic
and some non-economic
L&D)
Non-replaceable L&D
(non-economic L&D)
Sudden-onset extremes
(insurable L&D)
Measures (A)
• Risk transfer
- Insurance (e.g. with
subsidised premiums)
- Micro insurance
- Insurance/Risk pools
- Catastrophe bonds
• National and international
disaster funds
• Risk reduction
- Early warning systems
- Preventive building
measures
- Planned relocation
• Technology transfer
Measures (B)
• Recognition of loss
(accompanied by financial
payments or not)
• Active remembrance (e.g.
through museum
exhibitions, school
curricula)
• Counselling
• Official apologies
Slow-onset processes
(non-insurable L&D)
Measures (C)
• Risk reduction
- Preventive building
measures
- Physical risk reduction
measures (sea walls)
- Planned relocation
• Technology transfer
• Risk transfer via catastrophe
bonds
• Redress
• Rehabilitation
Measures (D)
• Alternative livelihoods
provision
• Recognition of loss
(accompanied by financial
payments or not)
• Active remembrance (e.g.
through museum
exhibitions, school
curricula)
• Counselling
• Official apologies
involvement of those responsible to contribute to the measures to be taken (for an
overview of categories and measures see Table 2.3).7
L&D needs to be rectified in order to ensure justice. Within the distributive jus-
tice framework, this means redistribution aiming at a baseline distribution where no
undeserved harm had ever occurred. In case of climate impacts, this means aiming
at overcoming undeserved burdens on some regions, communities, and individu-
als due to climate variability and extremes. In contrast to compensatory claims for
redistribution to even out undeserved harms it is only necessary that the harm in
fact can be neutralised by human action. This makes the distributive framing more
comprehensive. It not only captures L&D caused by anthropogenic climate change
7By thus arguing we implicitly assume the ability-to-pay principle as the appropriate principle for
differentiating responsibilities. In the next section we explain more thoroughly how we think this
principle must be understood in case of L&D.
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but also climate impacts brought about by natural climate variability and extremes.
However, a large amount of the responsibilities involved by these considerations
does not concern natural climate variability but anthropogenic climate change. Most
responsibilities captured in a distributive framework would also directly apply in a
compensatory framework as well.
The categorisation of appropriate measures to respond to different kinds of L&D
significantly depends on whether the distinction between adaptation and L&D is
drawn using a “beyond adaptation” or a “risk tolerance” approach. While according
to the “risk tolerance” approach, the appropriateness of measures does depend on
how those potentially affected assess different kinds of risk for L&D, the “beyond
adaptation” approach can do so without involving them. Focusing on the “beyond
adaptation” approach for now, the relevant climate impacts concern L&D that cannot
and also in some cases will not be avoided. L&D that cannot be avoided must be
considered undeserved harm to the extent that those facing climate impacts did not
contribute to their occurrence. L&D thatwill not be avoided is undeserved harm to the
degree that it can be traced back to adaptation constraints that are not self-inflicted.
In both cases, redistributive responses will have to differ depending on whether they
are designed to deal with replaceable or non-replaceable values, values which can
be non-economic/non-market-based or economic/market-based L&D.
In the case of economic/market-based L&D, measures will have to either man-
age/transfer financial risks or to provide adequate monetary/financial redress for
L&D. However, in the non-economic case, novel approaches for ends-displacing
have to be identified (Wallimann-Helmer 2015). Many such assets (encompassing
material goods and non-material services) fall into the category of non-economic
values, which have entered the L&D discourse as the concept of non-economic
loss and damage or, after COP21 in Paris, non-economic losses (NELD; see also
chapter by Serdeczny 2018). Commonly cited examples of NELD include loss of
life, human health, cultural heritage, ecosystem services and indigenous knowledge
(e.g. Fankhauser et al. 2014; Morrissey and Oliver-Smith 2013). NELD can occur as
direct and indirect consequences of climate change, including negative side effects
of adaptation (Serdeczny et al. 2016). They share the criterion that they are not
commonly traded in the market.8
Non-economic L&D can be replaceable or non-replaceable. Non-replaceable,
non-economic L&D or simply “losses” might be perceived as losses of irreplaceable
ends by those affected. In other words, the assets lost in case of this kind of L&D
might be perceived as ends in themselves. Following Goodin (1983), characteristics
for regarding assets as irreplaceable are typically tied to (1) personal integrity, both
bodily and mentally; (2) history; and (3) variety. Many assets typically listed as
NELD correspond to these characteristics. Loss of cultural identity, sense of place or
indigenous knowledge, for example, are inextricably tied to a community´s integrity
(Bell 2004; Heyward 2014; Zellentin 2010, 2015). A fishing community having lost
its traditional fishing grounds will never be the same again because it lacks a central
8For this reason, “non-market losses” might be a more adequate description of such losses, but the
term was not adopted in the policy process.
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part of its own integrity. Loss of cultural heritage relates to historical characteristics,
where no replica of the lost object will be regarded as equivalent to the original.
Finally, biodiversity, another often quoted NELD distinct from ecosystem services,
is valued as an asset of variety.
Offsetting losses of irreplaceable ends necessarily relies on providing alternative
ends that are perceived by those affected as being able to provide a similar level of
wellbeing compared to before the loss. The fishermen’s community might receive
funding enabling them to become farmers with comparable income levels, food
security and social status as before. However, according to Goodin (1989), a shift
in preferences will have been forced upon them, infringing upon their integrity and
personal autonomy and ultimately leaving them in a state of undeserved harm. What
follows is that actions that inflict the loss of irreplaceable assets on others can never
be fully addressed by any amount of remedy. This is especially important considering
financial payments. Whatever amount of money is paid to a harmed community, if
the ends are irreplaceable, by definition such payments cannot make the community
whole again. But financial payments and other actions recognising the fact of unde-
served L&D are certainly important steps for regaining a just baseline distribution
(cf. Thompson and Otto 2015; Huggel et al. 2016).
Non-economic but replaceable values can either fulfil different ends or consti-
tute ends in themselves, with the distinction being culturally- or even individually-
contingent. Ecosystem services, for example, are often valued as a means because
they provide important resources for human health and nourishment. The value of
cultural heritage in turn might be understood by some as a means to the end of com-
munity identity or social stability or by others as an end in itself. In case the losses
are means towards some end, an appropriate response would ideally replace those
lost means, i.e. to provide those affected with new means to achieve the same ends
(cf. Goodin 1989). Following such an understanding, loss of ecosystem services (e.g.
health and nourishment) could sensibly be responded to by providing medication to
maintain human health and supporting agricultural production to maintain previous
(if adequate) levels of nourishment. In other words, in order to even out undeserved
harms due to climate change, non-economic values which fulfil ends require mea-
sures for their replacement by other non-economic values or byfinancial payments. In
contrast to irreplaceable assets, if non-economic values are perceived as replaceable,
the undeserved harm can be fully addressed and the just baseline can be maintained
despite infliction of harm. This is more clearly the case when economic assets are at
issue. In many cases, economic goods can be replaced by simply reimbursing their
economic costs or by providing a substitute of the same (market) value.
It is far from clear, however, what mechanisms will lead to progress in making the
most vulnerable more resilient to climate change. In line with policy proposals and
current literature on mechanisms to tackle L&D (e.g. AOSIS 2008; Burkett 2014;
Mace and Verheyen 2016; Mechler and Schinko 2016), we identify L&D measures
comprising the following three components (see chapter by Schinko et al. 2018):
(1) Comprehensive risk management to support and promote risk management tools
to reduce the risk of future losses and damages in addition to mitigation and adap-
tation, (2) risk financing comprising risk-transfer, sharing and pooling to support
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particularly vulnerable countries to manage their increasing financial risks due to
increasingly frequent and severe extreme weather events, and (3) curative measures
such as redress and rehabilitation mechanisms to tackle irreversible impacts due to
progressive slow-onset processes (e.g. sea level rise, ocean acidification, increasing
land and sea surface temperatures) and sudden-onset extreme events that cannot or
will not be avoided.
Factoring in the distinction between economic and non-economic L&D, it seems
clear that risk management and risk-financing mechanisms—the intuitively most
plausible tools to deal with L&D—will not be sufficient in all cases (Surminski
et al. 2016). This is why, in addition to comprehensive risk management, including
risk-financing tools such as insurance, we may require curative action for redress
and rehabilitation (Mechler and Schinko 2016). Such action may address a fur-
ther important pillar of L&D measures, namely climate-related impacts that are
deemed uninsurable. This is either because insurance is not the right instrument for
tackling certain climate-related impacts, particularly those linked to slow-onset pro-
cesses, such as loss of territory with attendant human displacement (Burkett 2014),
or because commercial insurance is just not economically feasible.
Furthermore, it not only makes a difference whether risks of climate impacts are
insurable or not. It also makes a difference whether L&D measures are designed to
tackle sudden-onset extreme events or slow-onset processes. While risk financing
instruments such as insurance are a theoretically feasible strategy to tackle extreme
event risks, insurance is not applicable to deal with potential L&D caused by slow-
onset processes. Indeed, insurance mechanisms also have been found to encounter
limitations even in the case of sudden-onset risks (Mechler et al. 2014; chapters
on insurance in this book by Schäfer et al. 2018 and Linnerooth-Bayer et al. 2018).
Insurance may only be available for certain risks within a certain probability range or
forwhatwould be considered “acceptable” by those underwriting to the “risks based”
distinction between adaptation and L&D and, hence, may not apply to L&D. Risk
transfer and sharing schemes do not directly reduce the probability of occurrence or
the severity of negative impacts from climate risks, although they can provide incen-
tives to that end (Linnerooth-Bayer and Mechler 2009). Moreover, inappropriately
constructed insurance schemes can have unwanted consequences and may neither
benefit the poor nor foster climate resilience (Vivid Economics 2015).
What seems to be needed to appropriately address L&D is something like the
“Multi-Window Mechanism to address loss and damage” suggested by AOSIS
(AOSIS 2008) or what Roderick and Verheyen (2008) as well as Burkett (2014)
call a “Compensation Protocol” and a “Small Island Compensation and Rehabilita-
tion Commission to deal with impacts of slow-onset processes” (also cf. Boran and
Heath 2016).9 However, in our suggested framing the focus of such institutionswould
not only be on compensation and identifying the wrong-doers but rather on distribu-
tive justice. This would amount to redistributive mechanisms aiming at evening out
9The mechanism suggested by AOSIS consists of three inter-dependent components: (1) an insur-
ance component, (2) a rehabilitation/compensatory component, and (3) a risk management compo-
nent, which taken together aim at enhancing overall adaptive capacities in SIDS.
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undeserved L&D due to climate variability and extremes. What would be needed
is a coordinated redistributive scheme, which could be operationalised under the
UNFCCC as the body with the largest expertise and a clear focus on climate change
and relevant approaches to cope with it.
Notably, such a scheme neutralising undeserved L&D incorporating and combin-
ing all of the components of L&D measures mentioned in this section will require
substantial amounts of funding. Even though L&D is addressed in its own dedicated
Article 8 of the Paris Agreement, no new funding stream for addressing L&D has
been created. Nevertheless, as Mace and Verheyen (2016) point out, Article 8.3’s
reference to ‘action and support’, which should come through the WIM and the par-
ties’ action, demands financial mechanisms. With the exception of early voluntary
commitments by developed countries to support the insurance component of L&D
measures, it remains an open question what kind of existing funding schemes could
be accessed or which additional funding windows should be established to address
further components of L&D measures. Based on the two framings of compensatory
and distributive justice, in the next section we set out to answer the question of who
bears what responsibility for providing adequate levels of assistance in financial and
non-financial terms to establish a comprehensive portfolio of L&D measures.
2.5 Differentiating Responsibilities for L&D Measures
Responsibilities will vary depending on whether we are adopting a compensatory or
a distributive approach. Regarding the former approach, it is necessary to determine
who or which groups have contributed to the harm. This is challenging from the point
of view of attribution science as well as the applicability of national and international
law (cf. chapter on attribution by James et al. 2018 and chapter on legal issues by
Simlinger and Mayer 2018). Regarding the latter approach, redistribution to secure
differentiated support for those facing L&D for undeserved harms is required. This
is challenging from the point of view of being considerably more ambitious and
counter to the agreements contained under the umbrella of the UNFCCC. However,
since we are addressing the demands of justice here, it may be that justice requires
radical restructuring. In this section we argue that in order to be effective and efficient
a scheme to tackle L&D must take into account differences in capacity to provide
specific support but also communal ties. Under a distributive framing, this leads to
an extended ability to pay principle, incorporating considerations concerning how to
most efficiently and effectively remedy undeserved harm due to L&D. According to
this scheme, depending on the kinds of L&D at issue, different countries and regions
have different duties in light of their abilities to pay. If adopting a compensatory
approach, ability to pay might be a mitigating factor, but the compensation would
primarily stem from the responsibility a group had for the occurrence of the harms
in question.
To clarify the distinction between responsibility for the occurrence of undeserved
harm and responsibility for remedy of harm we suggest to consider the distinction
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between outcome responsibility and remedial responsibility: outcome responsibil-
ity denotes responsibility for bringing about a certain state of affairs and remedial
responsibility denotes responsibility to even out harm (Hart and Honoré 2002; Hon-
oré 2010; Miller 2007). Whilst the first kind of responsibility is backward-looking
the second looks forward. In principle, both these conceptions of responsibility are
independent. Irrespective of whether or not someone brought about a certain harm,
she can be responsible to (help) remedy that harm. We believe that seeing somebody
drowning puts us under duty to help, irrespective of whether we are responsible for
that person drowning. By contrast, being outcome responsible for a certain harm
does not always imply responsibility to (help) remedy this harm. Somebody who
trips and falls thereby pushing another person in front of him might be responsible
in terms of outcome but not necessarily in terms of remedy. If the one pushing could
not avoid tripping and tripping is not due to a fault of her own then this is bad luck
for both persons involved but no one is usually seen under duty for remedy.
In order to legitimately claim a connection between outcome responsibility and
remedial responsibility, some kind of normatively relevant tie between the two must
be established. Miller (2007) suggests moral failure, responsibility for the outcome
and mere causal contribution as legitimate reasons for assigning remedial respon-
sibilities based on outcome responsibility. If this kind of connection is or can be
established, then we are in the realm of compensatory justice, because in this case it
is the assignment of responsibility for a certain state of affairs that justifies remedial
responsibility. Generally speaking, themost obvious way to differentiate responsibil-
ities in case of harm like climate L&Dwould be to assign responsibilities for remedy
in proportion to the contribution to the harm, like levels of greenhouse gas emissions.
In case of L&D, the reasons linking outcome responsibility to remedial responsibil-
ity would amount to wrongful emitting, non-wrongful but significant contribution
to the harm, or causal contribution. Whichever of these three reasons is operative in
justifying a connection between outcome responsibility and remedial responsibility,
it operates within the framing of compensatory justice. Those bringing about a harm
are assigned responsibilities to make whole again those whom were impacted by
their behaviour.
The potential reasons for linking outcome responsibility with remedial respon-
sibility mentioned above are backward-looking, as is compensatory justice. When
a harm has materialised, considerations of compensatory justice aim at identifying
those responsible for the harm in order to assign remedial responsibilities. However,
in light of our discussion such a (purely) backward-looking assignment of remedial
responsibilities may not be fully appropriate for two reasons. First, in light of para-
graph 52 of decision 1/CP.21 it may become politically unfeasible since it would
amount to compensation and liability. This means that a “responsibility vacuum”
might emerge when, for political reasons, duty-bearers do not step up to their reme-
dial responsibilities. Furthermore, only a portion of experienced L&D would be
covered were remedial responsibility to be based on outcome responsibility only. As
shown before, natural climate variability as well as socio-economic factors on the
ground contribute to much of the L&D as well.
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Relying on Miller (2007) once again, there are at least three additional reasons
allowing the differentiated assignment of remedial responsibilitieswithout relying on
backward looking considerations of outcome responsibility. That is, reasons appli-
cable within a distributive justice framing. First, and in modification of the already
mentioned BPP, those currently benefitting the most from emissions contributing to
climate change are most often those also financially and technologically best able
to foster L&D measures. Second, those with the best know-how to support one or
several of the three components (comprehensive riskmanagement, risk financing and
curative measures) of a comprehensive scheme of L&D measures mentioned before
can most efficiently and effectively provide assistance. Third, indigenous and other
cultural knowledge shared by communities affected not only leads to special duties
among them but also might help to provide more appropriate and effective support in
practice. In the case of many communities and countries, the assignment of remedial
responsibilities according to the first two reasons will most probably overlap because
both determine the developed country parties to the UNFCCC to be under remedial
duty. The third reason, by contrast, probably identifies developing country parties;
e.g. members of AOSIS, to be under specified remedial duties.
Following on from Sect. 2.3 and independent of the reasons employed to assign
remedial responsibilities, support must be differentiated at least along the following
two lines: (a) whether L&D is replaceable or not, and (b) whether L&D measures
shall tackle slow-onset processes or sudden-onset extreme events (see Table 2.3). The
discussion in the previous section reveals that the first type of differentiation roughly
corresponds but is not identical with the distinction between economic and non-
economic L&D. The second type of differentiation largely correlates with whether
L&D is insurable or not. These differentiations/categories need to be taken into
account because a comprehensive scheme to appropriately tackle climate L&Dmust
ultimately differentiate responsibilities in an efficient and effective way in order to
be considered just. Notably, in terms of support for L&D, pledging finance is likely
not enough and probably not the most efficient and effective form of support for
communities and countries in need of assistance.What is further needed is assistance
in capacity building and technology transfer in order for these communities to be
able to take action allowing them efficiently and effectively to mediate the social and
economic costs of climate L&D.
Transfer of technology without know-how available tends to be less effective. In
order to be effective, we claim that a fair differentiation of responsibilities must not
only befall those able to foster L&D measures but also those potentially harmed. As
already mentioned, the effectiveness of measures is substantially increased if those
profiting from them are also involved in their implementation andmaintenance. Sim-
ilarly, shared indigenous or cultural knowledge especially in countries and regions
facing similar risks of L&D can become relevant as well. We believe that such ties as
well as geographic proximity can significantly increase the efficiency and effective-
ness of implementation and maintenance of measures (Wallimann-Helmer 2016).
Furthermore, without transfer of know-how, pledging finance might contribute to
unfairness when it comes to applying for financial support to implement L&D mea-
sures. For instance, there is far less detected and attributed climate events in countries
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probably facing the most severe climate impacts (Huggel et al. 2016). This is not
only the case because in these regions of the world measurement stations are lacking
but also because there is missing capacity to establish and analyse the necessary data
for effective risk management.
According to these considerations for assigning remedial responsibilities in rela-
tion to the four categories of L&D measures, we believe that replaceable L&D can
most probably be moderated by appropriate schemes of risk management and detec-
tion in combination with mechanisms of risk financing like insurance (see Table 2.4).
This is especially the case if that L&D is of an economic nature and occurs due to
expected sudden-onset extreme events. Countries under the greatest duties in this
case are those able to financially contribute to these schemes and/or possessing the
know-how to assist in implementing them. However, responsibilities might befall
other countries when slow-onset processes are at issue since these processes might
contribute to non-replaceable and non-insurable L&D. Although in such cases finan-
cial payments might have great importance in the sense of providing recognition for
undeserved harms, transfer of know-how between communities with similar cultural
experiences and under similar threats of L&D seems to be central to efficiently and
effectively helping even out the undeserved harms due to climate change. In case of
non-replaceable L&D, ends-displacing becomes necessary, a competencemost prob-
ably possessed by those communities already having gone through similar processes
of transformation.
Deciding whether or not non-economic L&D can be deemed replaceable is an
issue that is not easily determined without involving those facing these impacts
(Wallimann-Helmer 2015). This is so, because by definition non-economic L&D is
not traded in the market and cannot be weight up with any established market price.
This also makes it difficult to decide whether or not non-economic but replaceable
L&Dcan be insured since for insurance assessment of the financial value in economic
terms becomes key. And even if non-economic L&D can be deemed insurable, its
value to be insured cannot objectively be decided without involving those whose
assets are potentially damaged or lost due to sudden-onset extreme events or slow-
onset processes. For these reasons, for differentiating remedial responsibilities we
believe it to be crucial to also consider the differentiated competences to foster
appropriate decision-structures and capacity building within potentially threatened
communities. Indeed, this may apply either relying on outcome responsibilities or
reasons independent of responsibilities for the occurrence of L&D.
Once appropriate decision-making structures and capacity are established within
communities and countries potentially threatened by climate L&D and in need of
assistance, they acquire remedial responsibilities to other threatened countries aswell
(Wallimann-Helmer 2016). Appropriate finance and technology provided, develop-
ing countries not only acquire responsibilities for implementing and maintaining
L&Dmeasures in their own regions. Since they also gain specific know-how on how
to most efficiently and effectively respond to the specific L&D they face, they also
become more responsible to assist those facing the same or similar L&D. Conse-
quently, the more developed the decision-structures and capacities in communities
initially in need of assistance become, the more they acquire responsibilities to assist
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Table 2.4 Categorisation of the differentiated remedial responsibilities of countries to foster L&D
measures without exclusively relying on outcome responsibility
Replaceable L&D (economic and
some non-economic L&D)
Non-replaceable L&D
(non-economic L&D)
Sudden-onset extremes
(insurable L&D)
For measures (A) mainly
countries are remedially
responsible that are best able to:
• financially support risk transfer
(e.g. insurance or catastrophe
bonds) schemes
• financially support risk
reduction (e.g. preventive
building measures) and
relocation schemes
and/or
• provide technology and
know-how in setting up and
maintaining such schemes
For measures (B) mainly
countries are remedially
responsible that are best able to:
• financially support securing
recognition, remembrance of
loss and counselling
and/or
• provide experience and
know-how how to overcome
loss
Slow-onset processes
(non-insurable L&D)
For measures (C) mainly
countries are remedially
responsible that are best able to:
• financially support risk
reduction and relocation
schemes
• financially support catastrophe
bonds schemes for countries at
risk
and/or
• provide technology and
know-how in setting up and
maintaining such schemes
For measures (D) mainly
countries are remedially
responsible that are best able to:
• financially support securing
recognition, remembrance of
loss and counselling
and/or
• provide experience and
know-how how to achieve
alternative livelihoods
other communities and countries still in need of assistance. To increase efficiency
and effectiveness, it seems plausible that those countries are also under a duty to
assist those in need of assistance who are facing similar (risks of) L&D as they were
or are threatened with themselves.
2.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we aimed at mapping out the most important ethical considerations
relevant in case of climate L&D. Especially in light of the Paris Agreement and
the multi-causality of factors beyond anthropogenic climate change contributing to
L&D, we elaborated on the ethical implications of L&D—in the short to medium ter-
m—within a distributive framework. In addition to differentiating responsibilities in
light of compensatory considerations and liability, we argued that L&D could also be
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understood as undeserved harms demanding redistribution to even out unfairness. As
we have shown, evening out such unfairness demands being able to specify the mea-
sures exclusively relevant for L&D either defined as being beyond adaptation and/or
as intolerable levels of risks, where coping capacities of communities are breached.
However, regardless of the appropriate framing, it becomes essential to foster appro-
priate decision-making structures and capacity building for those facing the risks of
L&D. These capacities significantly contribute to the efficiency and effectiveness of
L&D measures, measures which comprise a complex net of approaches including
comprehensive risk management, risk finance schemes and curative mechanisms.
The advantage of the alternative framing of distributive justice is to help overcome
political deadlock and potential conceptual confusion. Notably, we do not claim com-
pensatory justice to be irrelevant for differentiating responsibilities for L&D. Much
of our deliberationsweremotivated by paragraph 52 of decision 1/CP.21which posits
that Article 8 of the Paris Agreement does not provide any basis for compensation or
liability. From this we read that implementing support for L&D based on compen-
satory justice may be currently politically unfeasible. However, political infeasibility
is not to be mistaken with moral appropriateness. We have argued that the conditions
for compensatory justice to apply, i.e. no excusable ignorance and exceeding fair
shares of emissions, potentially limit the application of compensatory claims at the
individual level. Here, the difficulty in attributing L&D to anthropogenic climate
change poses a further practical challenge.
However, we also argued that these considerations must be qualified at the com-
munity level of whole countries: No country can be excused anymore for ignorance
after publication of the IPCC reports, and the emissions of a large number of countries
have been deemed to exceed fair shares on multiple accounts. According to these
considerations, compensatory justice thus clearly becomes relevant and should drive
action of countries under the UNFCCC from amoral point of view. Notably, it should
drive increasedmitigation ambition as it is clear that some of the losses due to climate
change are irreplaceable and those affected cannot be made whole again. But as long
as compensation for L&D creates political deadlock and in order to secure that those
under threat get full and not only partial assistance, a framework based on distributive
justice to even out undeserved harm should be considered relevant in implementing
practical approaches to L&D and identifying responsibilities for doing so as well.
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